Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley: Whose leadership is it anyway? by Peshkova, Svetlana
Journal of International Women's Studies
Volume 11
Issue 1 Gender and Islam in Asia Article 2
Nov-2009
Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley:
Whose leadership is it anyway?
Svetlana Peshkova
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Recommended Citation
Peshkova, Svetlana (2009). Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley: Whose leadership is it anyway?. Journal of International
Women's Studies, 11(1), 5-24.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol11/iss1/2
   
 
 Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009 5 
Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley: Whose leadership is it anyway? 
 





There are many geographic and historical examples of Muslim women leaders, 
yet questions about women’s ability to lead and the kinds of leadership women can 
assume are still a part of scholarly and public debates among Muslims. In this article, 
based on two years of ethnographic fieldwork in the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan), I 
provide examples of Muslim women’s leadership and argue that in order to fully 
understand women’s leadership we need to question the assumption that men and women 
desire the same forms of leadership. A desire for leadership is not intrinsic to women (or 
humans in general) but is socio-historically specific. Approaching critically some existing 
assumptions about women’s leadership, I identify and provide examples of different, 
equally important, forms of leadership that a specific socio-historical context has 
engendered. 
 





 was described by some of her students as “the one who brings 
Islamic knowledge and spiritual peace into the hearts of the believers.”  Her other 
students called her a “people’s professor.” She called herself an otincha, a religious 
teacher. As she said, she “taught Islam” to some local women and occasionally children; 
some local men came by periodically to get her advice. At a meeting in 2002 in the 
Ferghana Valley, I asked Feruza-opa about Hizb-ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation), a 
transnational Islamist movement with the aim of establishing an Islamic State, which has 
became a prominent actor in regional political discourse in the first decade of the twenty 
first century. She replied, “they [the Hizb] think they have authority to go against the 
existing authority. I think that they will not do anything, just aggravate. Muhammad said 
‘do not go against the authority: good or bad, it is all from Allah. Do not go against the 
Time [history]: it is still God’s creation.’ All their parties…it is a waste of time. Many of 
them, men and women are in prison.” Feruza-opa did not support a vision such as Hizb-
ut-Tahrir’s of the Valley (or Uzbekistan) as an Islamic state. Her emphasis, in her words, 
was on “Muslim” and “Islamic” living, which according to Feruza-opa, heavily depended 
on one’s religious education and ritual prayer: “When you pray – keep the line with what 
Allah wants. ‘Five times a day remember Me’ [referring to Allah]… Namoz (ritual 
prayer) keeps you from [doing] different bad things. If you read namoz Allah will give 
you [grant your wishes].” Feruza-opa saw corporal and intellectual learning about 
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“Islamic living” as the only viable way of changing individuals, the local community and 
Uzbek society at large; as the only way of “not wasting time” and not being imprisoned. 
Feruza-opa believed in and stressed the transformative value of education: Our people are 
ovam hulq [uneducated people]. One needs to change people slowly. Otinchalar should 
also do it slowly, not fast. I believe that people should read the Qur’an more. Those who 
read will change themselves…We are yet to learn our religion. My mahallah 
[neighborhood], my students - they do not do and do not allow others to do gnoh 
[bad/evil deeds] because they know Islam. Mullahs [male religious leaders] also should 
not read for themselves; they should read for and with the people…. One needs to share 
what God gives you. If it is illim [knowledge, Ar. ‘ilm] you should share it too. What we 
can and must do is to tell people about Islam, to share knowledge, to educate each other 
and ovam hulq slowly. 
For Feruza-opa and women like her, individual and societal transformation 
through religious education was a slow moral process beginning with the sharing of 
(religious) knowledge. Through this sharing at religious ceremonies or during religious 
lessons, women like Feruza-opa,
3
 who were educated at the Soviet secular schools and 
had different levels of religious education acquired through family members, home-
schools and/or self-education, actively engaged in religious renewal in the Valley. They 
led others towards an ethical ideal of a moral community that knows the difference 
between evil and good deeds – that “knows Islam.” 
 
Can Muslim women be leaders? 
There is an ongoing debate among Muslims about women in leadership positions 
(cf. Stowasser, 2001): Can women be leaders? And, if so, what kind of leadership can 
they assume: religious (spiritual), political, both, or none? Muslim women, such as 
women leaders in the Ferghana Valley, continue to act as leaders without necessarily 
being recognized as such by formal religious and secular authorities. These women’s 
informal leadership is an example of an Islamization from below, from within local 
communities, as a moral individual and communal transformation. In this article I 
demonstrate that a distinction between formal and informal forms of religious 
leadership—the former associated with public domains and the latter with private 
domains—is not natural. Rather it is a result of certain historical developments 
characterizing a process of secularization and of religious renewal in the region. I show 
how women’s religious leadership informs local social transformation. Finally, I address 
the relevance of my research to the debate about Muslim women’s leadership. 
 
Writing the place and the researcher 
My ethnographic research (2001-2003) about post-Soviet religious renewal took 
place in the Ferghana Valley, a densely populated agricultural area (about six million 
people) with a few industrial cities shared among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan.
4
 The Valley is variously described by some as a hub of Islamic radicalism 
(e.g. Rashid, 2000; Rotar, 2006) and by others as the heart of Central Asian religious 
practices, arts, sciences, and spirituality (e.g. Egger, 2008; Khalid, 2007). Although it is 
tempting to talk about the region as Uzbek and Muslim, not every inhabitant of the 
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Valley is Uzbek, not every Uzbek is a pious Muslim, and not every pious Muslim is 
Uzbek. Society and religion “do not coincide” (Makris, 2007:7). There are other ethnic 
groups in the region, including Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Koreans, Russians, Roma and Jews, who 
variously profess Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and atheism. Among Muslims, being 
Muslim is expressed in a variety of ways. Some are devout. Others are cultural Muslims 
whose religious observance is limited to certain religious holidays. There are born-again 
Muslims who have transitioned from being cultural to being devout in post-Soviet 
Uzbekistan.
5
 There are also Muslim atheists who claim to not believe in God but who 
identify as Muslim because they were raised in Muslim households. In this article I focus 
on devout and born-again Muslims, Uzbek and others. 
Researching about born-again and devout Muslims in post-Soviet Central Asia, I 
travelled widely in the Valley and met Muslim women religious practitioners, teachers, 
and leaders (otinchalar) (cf. Fathi, 2006; Kamp, 2006). Their importance in local 
communities was highlighted by the interviewees on several occasions. I identified thirty 
otinchalar and focused on five of these and their students. These women, who were in 
their 40s-60s
6
, had been educated in the secular state schools and a couple had the 
equivalent of a bachelor’s or master’s degree (cf. Tolmacheva, 1993). They also had 
different levels of religious education acquired through family members, home-schools 
and/or self-education. They operated mainly in the private domain of individual homes 
and had full access to women and children and occasionally to men.
7
 
These women generously included me in their social circles. I was able to attend 
religious classes and ceremonies. I observed, participated in (sometime by just being 
there), and asked questions, while being questioned and observed by the otinchalar and 
others about my life and research interests. My academic degrees in religion and 
filmmaking, my Russian citizenship, my growing up in the Caucasus and my education in 
the United States might have facilitated my acceptance into these women’s social circles, 
within which I was grateful for being treated as a student and was taught about these 
women’s lives and their understandings of the teachings of Islam. However fragmented 
this process of learning might have been, it gives me some foundation to talk about these 
Muslim women’s leadership. 
 
Writing women’s lives as leaders 
Soviet ethnographers frequently categorized Muslim women in Central Asia as 
“the preservers of survivals,” “the bearers of a special ‘female religion’” and as 
representatives of “a certain cultural lag. . . and deficiencies in cultural-enlightenment 
work. . .” (Snesarev, 1974:226). Several scholars writing about post-Soviet Central Asia 
have criticized such essentialized assessments as being driven by ideological incentives 
and political expediency and argued that such accounts ignore the women’s differing 
histories, social and class contexts and levels of religiosity (e.g. Kamp, 2006; Keller, 
2001; Northrop, 2004). Despite recognizing a tapestry of women’s religious lives as a 
critically important element of social transformation in the region, the binary of 
“tradition” vs. “modernity” is still used by some scholars to explain complexities and 
                                                           
5
 Uzbekistan achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.  
6
 Younger otinchalar, in their 20s-30s, reported difficulty combining their religious leadership and family 
responsibilities. 
7
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contradictions in women’s lives in general and their religiosity in particular (e.g. Akiner, 
1997; Alimova & Azimova, 2000). Following Mahmood (2005), I argue that an 
understanding of these women’s religiosity should not be reduced to such a priori 
categories but should be critically analyzed as emerging from a particular socio-historical 
context that enables certain understandings of relationships among individuals, the state, 
the self and the Divine (2005:34). 
Women leaders are an important subject in academic writing about Muslim 
women’s lives in Indonesia, Iran, the Philippines, China, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan 
and other areas (e.g. Hoodfar, 2001; Horvatich, 1994; Jaschok & Jingjun, 2000; 
Mahmood, 2005; Privratsky, 2004; Shalinsky, 1996; von Doorn-Harder, 2006). In studies 
of post-Soviet Central Asia, Muslim women leaders  are variously described as female 
clerics/mullahs8 (Fathi, 1997; Kramer, 2002); a distinctive age-group of elder women 
who act as guardians of tradition and “preach the faith” (Alimova & Azimova, 2000; 
Corcoran-Nantes, 2005:139; Imamkhodjaeva, 2005; Tolmacheva, 1993); teachers 
(Constantine, 2007; Kamp, 2006; Kandiyoti & Azimova, 2004); experts in religion and 
ritual (Tokhtakhodjaeva, 1996:27); Qur’anic reciters (Khalid, 2007; Sultanova, 2000); 
and as mechanisms of conflict mediation within local families (Gorshunova, 2001). 
Various terms are used to refer to these women, such as otin, otonoy, or otin-oy 
(cf. Fathi, 2006; Khalid, 2007; Kramer, 2002). I utilize the term otinchalar, a plural form 
of the word otincha, which is a term of self-reference used by the women with whom I 
studied. The word otincha is often translated as “teacher,” yet in my experience its usage 
and conceptual meaning exceed educational domain. Following Marranci (2008), I think 
of otinchalar as women who feel to be Muslim, desire to be better Muslims, rationalize 
and act on these feeling and desire in various ways, including but not limited to 
facilitating religious ceremonies among local women by reciting and interpreting 
religious texts, and teaching these women (and occasionally children but rarely men) 
about Islam’s history, principles and sacred texts (cf. Fathi, 2006). Some of them perform 
and teach hymns about justice and salvation, while others focus on healing. Through this 
array of activities, discourses, and performances, they systematically modify their 
environment and lead their communities towards moral transformation, as understood by 
these women. 
 
Are otinchalar female mullahs, clerics, or imams? 
The word imam is often taken to mean a leader in both religious scholarship and 
congregational prayer. To be an imam one has to have a set of minimal qualifications, 
such as an ability to recite the Qur’an, sufficient knowledge about performing a ritual 
prayer, and a reputation for reason and piety (Mattson, 2005:11). Some scholars refer to 
otinchalar as female mullahs and clerics. These women and their communities, however, 
do not use these labels, although otinchalar do perform functions among local women 
similar to those an imam does among the men. In addition to the qualifications described 
above, some otinchalar are familiar with Islamic doctrine, history, and Islam’s normative 
system (Ar. al-Shari’ah) and become local religious leaders through promoting 
educational and ritual practice and providing social advice articulated in religious terms. 
Following Mattson (2005), I argue that to define or think of otinchalar as clerics, mullahs 
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or imams is to assume that these leadership positions are standard, thus obscuring rather 
than clarifying gendered dynamics of Islamic religious leadership. In order to understand 
these dynamics we should critically interrogate socio-historical contexts that engender 
different forms of leadership such as otinchalar’s and question the assumption that all 
Muslim women everywhere aspire to have the same leadership positions as do the men. 
 
Muslim women leaders: a her-story 
There are many examples of Muslim women leaders in authoritative religious and 
historical sources, such the hadith literature, the Prophet’s biographies (e.g. by 
Muhammad Ibn Sa`d (d. 844-45)),
9
 and in contemporary academic biographies of these 
leaders.
10
 Yet, Mattson (2005) suggests that the quest for clear Qur’anic guidelines for 
gendered leadership and a clear distinction between political and religious (or spiritual) 
leadership is fruitless: these are not to be found in the Qur’an. Rather, Qur’anic verses 
give general guidelines regarding forms of leadership. For instance, these verses stress 
regularity of ritual performance and the importance of consultation with one’s 
community (Q 42:38); highlight leading one family’s and one’s life in righteousness (Q 
25:74); and thus emphasize a critical importance of a code of individual and social ethics, 
and warn against selfishness and evil (Q 4:49). Hence, Quran’ic verses do not provide a 
clear set of standards for gendered leadership, nor do they clearly distinguish between the 
two forms of leadership, religious (spiritual) and political. Rather, such Qur’anic verses 
emphasize ritual performance and individual and communal ethics as important markers 
of a leader. 
The hadith literature, a more potent source used to debate women’s leadership, 
provides both examples of women’s leadership and the stories (I will refer to one of these 
later in the article) used to limit women’s leadership. The Prophet and his family play 
critically important roles in the historical and contemporary global, local, physical and 
online debates about women’s leadership. Many Muslims regard the members of the 
Prophet’s family as behavioral models worth imitating. The hadith literature provides the 
early models of feminine behavior, ranging from sincere support to rebellion to 
leadership. The Prophets’ wives Khadijah and Aisha, his daughter Fatima, and 
granddaughter Zaynab are the earliest examples of Muslim women leaders (see Abbott, 
1942; Ahmad, 2006; Mernissi, 1996; Wadud, 1999). 
The fourteen hundred years of history of Muslim communities is both a his-story 
and a her-story. Although putatively universal histories often turn out to be histories of 
the masculine (his-stories) (Irigaray, 1974:165), contemporary scholars of Islam have 
successfully highlighted the stories of the feminine (her-stories). Beginning with Hagar, 
the mother of Ish’mail, the one divinely appointed to bear forth “the Arab and later 
Muslim civilization,” we encounter a multitude of women leaders (Abugideiri, 2001:81). 
Their patience and perseverance assured expansion of Islamic principles and genealogical 
and cultural continuity and contiguity of his- and her-stories in the histories of Muslims 
in various parts of the world. 
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A long history of religious leadership among Muslims includes various women 
Sufi masters (e.g. As-Sulami, 1999) and Muslim women scholars of hadith (e.g. Siddiqi, 
1993). Muslim women leaders are mentioned in several bibliographical accounts about 
the Prophet’s women companions (Ar. sahabiyyat). Among these is Umm Waraqa bt. 
`Abd Allah b. al-Harith, who was instructed by the Prophet to continue leading members 
of her household (both men and women) in prayer at her home (Afsaruddin, 2002). 
Muslim women’s leadership assured steady incremental changes in both practice 
and theological developments from medieval to contemporary Islamic thought. Al-
Sakhawi, a 15
th 
century scholar, in his bibliographical work Kitab al-Nisa (the Book of 
[about] Women), describes a large number of women religious scholars, refers to them as 
kathirat al-riyasa (having plentitude of leadership), and notes that they became spiritual 
and educational leaders for him and other male scholars (Afsaruddin, 2007). Nadwi 
(2007) also provides biographies of various women teachers and scholars who wielded 
considerable public authority in their societies; these were not exceptional cases. 
Some Muslim women leaders, such as Rabyah al-Basri (e.g. Schimmel, 1975) or 
Zaynab al-Gazali (e.g. al-Ghazali, 1989), avoided public spaces (thought of as “male 
spaces”) by both literary and figuratively veiling themselves with special veils. Others, 
such as Bahithat al-Badiyah, aggressively injected themselves in these spaces to 
challenge the status quo of local mosques as male spaces (al-Jabri, 1976:16; Badran, 
1995: 54-55). Pious Shi’a women in Lebanon and an Egyptian women’s mosque 
movement are other examples of Muslim women’s leadership in various Islamic and 
Islamists movements (e.g. Deeb, 2006; Mahmood, 2005; von Doorn-Harder, 2006). 
The most widely publicized historical examples of Muslim women’s leadership 
are Razia al-Din, a 13
th
 century ruler of India (Zakaria, 2000); Nana Asma’u, a 19
th
 










present multiple examples of Muslim women leaders such as Huda Shaarawi, an 
Egyptian leader in the struggle against colonialism (Shaarawi, 1987). Riffat Hassan, 
Amina Wadud, Asma Barlas, Leila Ahmed, Fatima Mernissi, Amira Sonbol, Sharifa 
Alkhateeb, Hadia Mubarak, Ingrid Mattson, Heba Raouf Ezzat, are among well-known 
current Muslim scholars and activists.
11
 
Finally, several ethnographies recognize, describe and analyze the everyday lives 
of Muslim women leaders whose names are largely pseudonyms, such as Turkish hojas 
(or hocas) (Saktanber, 2002); Philippine pandai (Horvatich, 1994); Syrian Qubaysis 
(ethnographic research is yet to be done but see Hamidi, 2006; Kalmbach, 2008:39); 
female Syrian teachers (Kalmbach, 2008); Iranian “female mullahs”(Hoodfar, 2001); 
Bosnian bula (Bringa, 1995); Chinese ahong (Gillette, 2000; Jaschok & Jingjun, 2000), 
Indonesian activists, preachers, and leaders (von Doorn-Harder, 2006), and women 
leaders and preachers in Pakistan (Hegland, 1997; Nasr, 1994), Egypt (Mahmood, 2005) 
and Nigeria (Sule & Starraff, 1991). In short, there is no shortage of Muslim women 
leaders throughout the historical and geographical landscape of Muslim communities. 
Otinchalar in the Ferghana Valley are among them. 
 
The State, Islam, and gender 
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 Some Muslim women are acting and former heads of state, such as the late Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, 
Tansu Penbe Çiller of Turkey, and Khaleda Zia and Sheik Hasina Wazed of Bangladesh.  
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To understand the importance of otinchalar and their forms of leadership in 
Uzbekistan, I would like to present a précis of historically rather problematic 
relationships between Islam and the state in the 20th century (for a detailed historical 
analysis see Keller, 2001; Khalid, 2007; Northrop, 2004). Following Marranci (2008), I 
take Islam to be a map of discourses on how to feel and act as Muslim. Following 
Foucault (1978), I take the state to mean an aggregation of various administrative and law 
enforcement institutions, constituted by individuals whose individuality is submitted to a 
set of patterns. This aggregation has an authority to make rules that govern people living 
within a particular territory and its “techniques of power [are] present at every level of 
the social body and utilized by very diverse [social] institutions …”(Foucault, 1978: 141). 
From its inception, the Soviet state was envisioned as a secular union of republics. 
In order to imprint this vision of the state onto its diverse subjects in Central Asia, the 
Bolsheviks (later known as the Communists) sponsored a socio-political campaign 
against overtly expressing one’s religious identity. Defined by the organizers as a 
normative Islamic practice, veiling became a focus of this campaign. Assault on legal 
religious institutions, such as Shariat courts,12 and the waqf property (religious land 
endowment) were other foci of this campaign (Haghayeghi, 1996). The organizers 
positioned gender as a center of radical social change (Northrop 2004), while 
essentialized Islam was defined as an oppressive socio-politically system that molded its 
subjects through restrictive practices such as veiling (cf. Geertz, 1968; e.g. Northrop, 
2004). According to this model, if Islam was uprooted through unveiling
13
 and other 
means, the Soviet state as a secular union would have an uncontested ability to exercise 
power over its Central Asian subjects. During this campaign many mosques were closed 
and some clergy were arrested, exiled, or executed. Some religious activities became 
formalized under state political control and required registration and state-run economic 
management. Other religious activities became informal as they took place mainly in 
domestic space. These activities and leaders, such as otinchalar, could not be effectively 
persecuted or controlled by the state and became respected conduits of religious 
knowledge and practice for the local population. 
Scholarly assessments vary regarding these attempts at producing a Soviet state as 
a secular union and at transforming gender roles (Kamp, 2006; Tokhtakhodjaeva, 1995). 
But there were two important outcomes of this campaign. First, some religious activities 
became formalized under state political control and required registration and state-run 
economic management. Other religious activities became informal as they took place 
mainly in domestic space. These activities and leaders, such as otinchalar, could not be 
effectively persecuted or controlled by the state and became respected conduits of 
religious knowledge and practice for the local population. 
The second outcome was adoption and definition of certain expressions of 
religiosity as “national traditions” by the Communist Party in 1930s while realizing that 
excessive use of force only alienated local populations (Keller, 2001). By the end of 
                                                           
12 Shariat (Ar. al-Shari’ah) is “a normative system of Islam as historically understood and developed by 
Muslim jurists… [which] includes a much broader set of principles and norms than legal subject matter as 
such” (An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed. 2002 Islamic Family Law in a Changing World. London: Zed Books. 
p. 1). 
13
 Kamp (2006) argues that unveiling was underway among some women before the Bolsheviks’ campaign 
(p.133).  
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the1930s, the Communist Party realized its inability to uproot Islam completely and 
adopted definitions of certain expressions of religiosity as “national traditions” 
maintained by discourses such as “differences in gender roles,” importance of sexual 
honor and family values, and “views of marriage … [as] companionship more than 
equality” (Kamp, 2006:230). Reflecting some of these discourses about family values and 
differences in gender roles, men were expected “to go out and engage in the rough and 
tumble of the world, whereas women were to guard the chastity of the home and of the 
community” (Khalid, 2007:103). Women’s participation in Soviet social life was not 
limited, yet centered heavily on “inner values of the community” that were nurtured 
through social gatherings and religious ceremonies taking place in domestic space (and at 
sacred sites), thus giving them [women] a central place in religious leadership (e.g. 
Kandiyoti & Azimova, 2004; Khalid, 2007:103). 
The independence of Uzbekistan from the Soviet Union in 1991 stirred a new 
hope of religious freedom and a growing support from the Uzbek state of Islam as a 
symbol of national identity. New mosques were built. Some religious schools were re-
opened, and some clergy—overwhelmingly male— were trained in Turkey (Khalid, 
2007:118-120). Religious education for many men and for some women was offered at 
various outlets in both informal (e.g. home-schools) and formal (e.g. Islamic University 
in Tashkent and schools of higher Islamic education (madrasas)) domains (cf. Fathi, 
2006; Rasanayagam, 2006). 
Soon after independence, in the context of a great economic decline, ex-
Communist elites consolidating their power and fearing religious and political opposition 
pursued a course of taking control of Islam and persecuting many religious leaders, both 
formal and informal and both men and women (e.g. McGlinchey, 2007). The informal 
leaders operating in the private domain of people’s homes were less accessible to the 
state and therefore suffered less persecution (Fathi, 2006:313). 
Thus, a distinction between formal and informal forms of religious leadership (the 
former associated with public domains and the latter with private domains) was a result 
of certain historical developments characterizing a process of secularization and of 
religious renewal in the region. This distinction continued to inform expressions of public 
religiosity. Although all religious leaders -- formal and informal -- were respected by the 
local people, at the time of research otinchalar were among informal religious leaders 
seen by the local people as independent from the discredited political regime, who 
continued to lead local Muslims through religious education, ritual practice, advice, and 
persuasion, towards moral transformation in spite of growing state control. 
 
Leading how? 
Otinchalar lead local communities in three areas: teaching, religious practice and 
socio-religious advice. Otinchalar with a higher level of religious knowledge teach 
women at their home-schools. The acquired religious knowledge allows some of these 
women to critically assess their religious rights and their social context. This critical 
assessment does not manifest itself in production of either clearly gendered or feminist 
(broadly defined) discourses. It does help local women to evaluate their social 
environment in light of religious knowledge as a first step towards changing this 
environment, if they chose to do so. 
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During one class Feruza-opa began a discussion of polygyny (a social practice when 
a male has multiple female spouses) by reciting the verse from the Qur’an (Q 4:3) that 
some interpret to sanction polygyny.
14
 Polygyny was a highly contested issue in the 
Ferghana Valley.  In an interview Aylar, one of the students, stressed that since 
Uzbekistan’s independence it became a common practice for some men (often financially 
secure) to have mistresses: “They can have three or four mistresses and it is not 
considered to be a problem. One of these mistresses may become an illegal wife [in 
secular terms].” Aylar also mentioned that people’s evaluation of such marriages varied 
from condemnation to acceptance. In some cases, according to her, “the wives could even 
come and visit with each other.” 
In response to the recited verse and its interpretation by Feruza-opa, who emphasized 
equal treatment of the wives as a necessary prerequisite of a polygynous marriage, two 
students expressed their disapproval of polygyny. Another student highlighted its 
situational usefulness as in a case of the first wife’s sickness, when, according to this 
student a husband could take a second wife to help raise the kids and care for the sick 
wife.  Another student talked about the economic security that a polygynous marriage, 
although emotionally draining, can offer some women in Uzbekistan. 
Reminding the students about the cultural and historical context of this social 
practice by locating the verse in the “old times Arabston [referring to what now is Saudi 
Arabia and surrounding countries],” Feruza-opa stressed that “Islam set a limit to four,” 
and posited a question to her students whether one could deal justly with four wives. The 
students differed in their answers. Normative morality, however Divine in origin it might 
have been, was understood by the students over against their social environment, thus 
allowing these women to form their understanding and their moral assessment of 
polygyny. For some this understanding was the first step towards accepting polygyny, 
while for others it was the first step towards challenging it as unjust.   
During another class in Feruza-opa’s home-school, the teacher and the students 
discussed the issue of mahr15 and marriage contracts, which Feruza-opa defined as a 
normative Islamic practice. A couple of students stated that they have not heard of any 
marriage contracts in the Valley. Another student replied:A marriage contract would be a 
good thing if it were to provide a woman with enough money to support her and her 
children after divorce or if something happened to her husband. Local mullahs are against 
it. They say 10-30,000 sums [about 10-30 dollars at the time] is sufficient, depending on 
whether a female is a virgin. It is less if she is not a virgin. It is not right (participant-
observation 2003). 
By assessing local practices of mahr and noting a lack of marriage contracts in light of 
their religious knowledge, the students and the teacher eventually concluded that local 
practices supported by formal religious leadership were “not right.” 
Fatima-hon, also an otincha, insisted on using the Qur'an as the foundation of her 
teaching rather than accepting the opinions of others, such as formal religious leaders, as 
normative: Some say “My relatives did this…. My dad was a mullah, he did that…” I 
                                                           
14
 This verse can be understood as follows (from Yusuf Ali’s (1938) English translation): “Marry women of 
your choice, Two or three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then 
only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing 
injustice.” (The Holy Qur-an, Text, Translation and Commentary. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Arabia) 
15
 Mahr is a reverse dowry paid by the groom to the bride used for her maintenance in the event of divorce. 
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say, God will not care about it. You need to do things God's way…. I am trying to teach 
people what is right and good, based on what is in the Qur’an. 
Thus, otinchalar’s religious knowledge helped them and their students evaluate and 
when necessary challenge Islamic orthodoxy
16
 produced by other religious leaders, 
identified by otinchalar as male. These women generated their own discourses about 
being “right and good” Muslims. 
These differing discourses on how to feel and act Muslim were contested among 
otinchalar and between themselves and other formal religious leaders. The latter 
criticized otinchalar’s educational and religious practices as wasteful and un-Islamic, 
while the secular Uzbek state saw these as subversive activities that could potentially 
foster religious and political opposition (cf. Fathi, 2006:309-312; Kandiyoti & Azimova, 
2004:342-343). There were other formal religious leaders, however, who consulted with 
some local otinchalar on matters of Islamic knowledge (cf. Imamkhodjaeva, 2005:336). 
Feruza-opa reported that “the most important imam” in one city in the Valley called on 
her several times for advice on religious matters. Many local men also sought blessings 
and advice from an otincha. 
Otinchalar also provided local women with places for religious observance inside the 
women’s homes and at sacred sites. Some hadith literature,17 spatial restrictions, or 
customary practices are used to discourage women from attending mosques. Muslim 
women have varied responses to defining the mosque as a male space. Some of them 
struggle to carve their place in the mosque (Egypt see Mahmood, 2005), choose not to 
attend the mosque (Iran see Friedl, 2000:159), have their own mosques (China see 
Gillette, 2000; Jaschok & Jingjun, 2000), or use local shrines (Bosnia, Uzbekistan, Iran 
see Bringa, 1995; Friedl, 2000; Gorshunova, 2000). In the Ferghana Valley some 
customary practices referred to locally as “our tradition” and spatial limitations (such as a 
lack of women’s space at the local mosques) stifled women’s attendance and prayers at 
mosques (although I was told that in the capital Tashkent, a very small number of women 
did attend mosques).
18
 In this context, local women developed their own vital religious 
activities, which often were home-centered, excluded men, and were officiated by 
otinchalar, who sacralized women’s domestic space and made it suitable for 
congregational prayer and ceremonial activities by reciting the Qur’an. 
                                                           
16
 Asad (1986) defines Islam as a discursive tradition. The adherents of this tradition are actively engaged 
in production of orthodoxy—“the establishment of a dominant version of religious tradition in specific 
historical conjunctions through a discursive process that extends in time and space” (Makris, 2007: 38).  
17
 For example, “Do not forbid women from going to mosques, (but) their houses (buyut) [sic] are better for 
them” (Abu Dawud, Sulayman b. Al-Ash’ath, 1935, Sunan, 4 vols. Cairo: Dar al-Fikr). In the process of 
production of orthodoxy, however, a range of opinions addressed gendering of space. Some interpreted 
sacred sources (the Qur’an and the hadith literature) as neither precluding nor fostering women’s 
participation in the mosque’s activities. Others insist that a house, not the mosque, is the most appropriate 
place for women’s religious observances. [Here I am referring to the Sunni positions, as many devout and 
born-again Muslims claimed to follow the Hanafi mashab (Ar. madhab) one of the schools of jurisprudence 
in Sunni Islam.] These differing positions are historically contingent and are inhabited variously by devout 
individuals. 
18
 Imamkhodjaeva (2005) refers to this prohibition in the past tense. My feeling is that her data is gathered 
in the capital and also at the time when the regime was toying with the idea of “safe” Islam (1991-1995). 
Fathi (2006) mentions women’s attendance of the mosques without specifying where. During my research 
in the Valley this prohibition, both overt and covert, was still in action.  
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These otinchalar also delivered messages that addressed the community’s moral 
standards and individuals’ ethical behavior. In this sense, the mosque came to the 
women’s homes instead of them going to the mosques. Although during interviews some 
local women expressed a desire to attend mosques, many were completely disinterested: 
“The Qur’an says that one needs to pray socially within a group and we do just that at our 
meetings and the information discussed in the mosques we receive from our husbands” 
(interview 2002). 
As part of religious ceremonies, otinchalar taught and preached about religious 
renewal through didactic storytelling. These stories were based on the Qur’an, ahadith 
and other sources and produced by otinchalar in response to the local people’s everyday 
concerns. In the first decade of the 21
st
 century many local women and men suffered 
great economic hardships as a result of growing state authoritarianism and crumbling 
local economies and industries. On one occasion Feruza-opa’s message focused on a 
moral obligation of individuals to share their resources and called on the individuals to 
change their socioeconomic situation: In Islam it is a good thing to help others, either 
with money, a good deed, or a kind word…. The more you give, the more you get. Even 
if you give spiritual goods such as a kind word or a prayer, you might get material goods 
as a reward from God. If you will give material you might get spiritual rewards, such as 
peace and love. If God gave you money but did not give you imon [dignity], God will not 
multiply your wealth. If you do not have imon you will lose your material goods. There 
are some poor people, who… are lazy and are envious of those who do have money. This 
is not good either. The envy should stimulate people and not destroy them. God wants 
you to share and work towards changing your economic condition…. If you are jealous 
of those who make money, try to use this jealousy to make more money than they do, and 
share it with others (participant-observation 2002). 
This message targeted the moral side of economic inequality by focusing on and 
fostering individual desire to share, yet equally emphasizing individual moral 
responsibility in the process of on-going socioeconomic transformation in the Valley. 
As reservoirs of religious knowledge, otinchalar are often asked for advice on social 
and familial matters. On one occasion in the spring of 2003, some local women asked an 
otincha if physically punishing minors was an Islamic practice. She responded that 
[i]f a child offended you, do not strike your child. The child is not guilty. It is you 
who is guilty. You did something wrong… did not pray, or have neglected some 
of your religious duties…. Instead you should thank God for reminding you about 
your duties through your children. Do not offend God, so that you can give a 
proper example to your children of how to live their lives Islamically and not to 
offend you. Change your behavior if you want to change your children’s. 
Hence, according to this otincha, physical punishment was un-Islamic. It was individual 
moral transformation that served as a prerequisite to a moral change within one family 
and society. 
 
Leading toward what? 
Muslim women leaders in the Ferghana Valley actively participate in regional 
social change. They think of social change as a moral renewal, a purification of existing 
Islamic practices, and seem to have an implicit methodology for this renewal. Societal 
moral renewal starts with a moral regeneration in otinchalar’s lives, their families’ lives, 
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and then their students’ lives. Once they achieve a level of moral transformation, 
otinchalar begin leading local Muslims (women, children, and men) away from certain 
practices defined by them as un-Islamic and foreign; as Feruza-opa stated at a meeting in 
2002, “[t]here are many practices that have nothing to do with Islam. Our people are 
ovam hulq [uneducated people], who are mistaken in their practices. Otinchalar have to 
correct them… we have to educate each other and the ovam hulq slowly.” 
This leadership continues toward what I, following Asad (2003) and Marranci 
(2008), call otinchalar’s highly variegated discursive Islamic orthodoxy about how to 
feel and act as Muslims. They disagreed on various matters such as shrine worship and 
attendance of sacred places (whether these practices were Islamic), on how to conduct 
burial rites, number of spouses (wives), marriage ceremonies, and what was an 
appropriate form of covered (Islamic) dress. Although at the time of the research there 
were some disagreements among otinchalar on how to be “right and good” Muslims, 
these women saw not a revolution but a moral evolution as the primary paradigm for 
legitimate social change in the Valley. There was a very clear sense of the temporal 
extension of this process in Fatima-hon’s description of her leadership: I criticize 
people’s actions and I know that it is hard for people to hear criticism…. I ask for their 
forgiveness and continue to criticize…. I ask my audience to think about what I said. 
“Maybe later, maybe tomorrow”…  I am sure it comes back to them… [W]e, otinchalar, 
have to help people with these changes…. If we were good, our rulers would be good. 
Everything starts with a person and with the family… One needs to work on her 
goodness… We need to change ourselves first (interview 2003). 
These otinchalar realized and upheld the importance of individual desire to change and 
saw themselves as facilitators (or helpers) in cultivating this desire by providing some of 
the necessary tools, such as their knowledge of religious sources. In Feruza-opa’s words,  
“[t]hose who read [the Qur’an] will change themselves.” Hence, the genuine change had 
to come from an individual capable of reading and understanding these sources, not 
otinchalar, and not the state. 
These women claimed to not believe in political engagement with the state. 
According to them, an Islamist political party could not bring a meaningful social change, 
Feruza-opa saw political activism of a local branch of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (The Party of 
Liberation) as “a waste of time” and “an aggravation.” Rather, otinchalar were engaged 
in a very different, according to them apolitical and yet, similar to the mosque movement 
in Egypt, very political project— a project of moral transformation from within an 
individual and local communities (Mahmood, 2005:34-35). Their politics exemplified 
what Mahmood (2005:192) refered to as “politics in unusual places.” By constituting 
informal networks rather than formal organizations, otinchalar were more productive in 
constructing and transmitting Islamic knowledge and helping to forge a common, 
however contested, moral identity as “right and good” Muslims among some members of 
their communities. Less vulnerable to the state and formal religious authorities’ control, 
they became important nodes connecting local women in their pursuit of moral 
transformation. These expanded networks were more sustainable and effective than the 
occasional political demonstrations that took place in the region and which were easily 
put down by the state.
19
 
                                                           
19
 As reported by Human Rights Watch (2005), one of these protests in 2005 culminated in the massacre of 
civilians by government forces in the Valley’s city of Andijan (Andijon) (Khalid, 2007:192-198).  
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These otinchalar acted as leaders among other women and within their local 
communities without necessarily being recognized as such by formal religious and 
secular authorities. They did not accept the formal religious leadership’s understanding 
and interpretation of Islamic principals as normative, but inhabited this normative 
discourse and actively participated in the production of their variegated orthodoxy as 
ways of being “right and good” Muslims. By teaching religious classes in their homes, 
conducting ritual ceremonies at local women’s homes, and by providing advice on social 
and individual matters, these otinchalar introduced incremental social changes, both as 
intended and “unintended outcome[s] of social reproduction…” (Giddens, 1984:220). In 
other words, as leaders they cultivated a gradual moral renewal in their lives and their 
communities. 
Although these women were not referred to locally as clerics, imams or mullahs, 
nor did they self-identify as such, they performed functions, as discussed above, among 
local women similar to those performed by imams and mullahs among the men. They 
were also recognized by the local communities as legitimate reservoirs of religious 
knowledge and practice; they were “people’s professor[s]” and “taught Islam,” as the 
opening paragraph demonstrates. But did they desire to hold the same leadership 
positions as did the men? 
 
Whose leadership? What leadership? 
In an ongoing debate among Muslims about women’s leadership, which is 
connected to the question of gender equality, the Qur’an and hadith literature are used to 
justify different and often opposite positions. For the purposes of this article I sort these 
positions into three categories: conservative, Islamic feminist, and no-uniformity. These 
different positions all share an assumption that women desire the same forms of 
leadership as the men hold. Further, in making a distinction between religious (spiritual) 
and political leadership these positions reflect an assumption that political leadership is 
limited to the realm of “politics as usual” such as participation in political parties, 
judiciary system, and/or electoral office, or acting as formal religious leaders at the 
mosques; in short to one’s public engagement with the state. 
A radical conservative view considers women’s leadership (both religious and 
political) to be un-Islamic and a result of Westernization and moral corruption. A less 
dramatic conservative view allows for religious leadership among women but prohibits 
all forms of political leadership. One of the most interrogated verses in regards to 
women’s leadership is Qur’an 4:34.
20
 This verse and a famous hadith reported by Abu 
Bakra
21
 serve a backbone for a conservative position on religious leadership, whose 
proponents, as Abugideiri (2001) argues, have a gendered understanding of the word 
                                                           
20
 English interpretations of the verse are often gendered and reductive. These interpretations are contested. 
According to Yusuf Ali’s (1938) English interpretation a relevant part of this verse reads as follows: “Men 
are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the 
other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly 
obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard…”  (The Holy Qur-an, 
Text, Translation and Commentary. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Arabia). For a different interpretation of this 
(and other) verse(s) see Laleh Bakhtiyar (2007) The Sublime Qur’an. Kazi Publications. 
21
 Imam Bukhari reports from Abu Bakra “… When news reached the Prophet that the Persians had 
appointed Chosroe's daughter as their ruler, he said: ‘A nation which placed its affairs in the hands of a 
woman shall never prosper!’” (Volume 5, Book 59, Number 709).  
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“leadership,” which “comes to represent the invisible construct, certainly assumed to be 
masculine, to which the qualifier ‘female’ must be added in order to shift the focus from 
larger issues of Islam to issues exclusive to women” (2001:89-91). Unquestionably 
accepting this gendering of leadership relegates Muslim women “to the role of subject, 
but without agency” (ibid.). One of the prominent representatives of the conservative 
position, the famous theologian Syed Abul A'ala Maududi (d. 1979), interpreted this 
Qur’anic verse to mean that if “[m]en are the managers of the affairs of women because 
Allah has made the one superior to the other and because men spend of their wealth on 
women,” then women cannot be leaders over or for men (Shehab, 1986:117). 
The supporters of an Islamic feminist view of leadership provide different 
articulations of leadership among Muslims through alternative readings and re-
interpretations of the same (and other) religious and historical sources (for a discussion of 
Islamic Feminism see Badran, 2002, 2009). Some representatives of Islamic feminism 
argue that this hadith by Abu Bakra is not authentic (e.g. Mernissi, 1996). Other scholars 
interpret the same Qur’anic verse to mean that men are “those who provide a means of 
support or livelihood,” which does not mean that women cannot or should not provide for 
themselves, but simply that in view of the heavy burden that most women shoulder in 
childbearing and rearing, they should not have the additional obligation of providing the 
means of living at the same time (Hassan, 1999: 264). 
Amina Wadud, an American Islamic feminist and scholar, challenged the conservative 
view of women’s leadership theologically in her writings and interviews and physically 
by leading a mixed-gender Friday prayer in New York City in 2005 both as “a leader and 
a woman” (Wadud, 1999; 2007:183). 
A no-uniformity view suggests that there is no uniform position on the matter of 
women’s leadership. Recognizing a de-centered nature in religious knowledge 
production, this view’s proponents suggest that the very nature of Islam should result in 
multiple positions on this issue. Muslim theologian Abu Hanifa suggested that women 
could hold public office and act as judges “except in the case of criminal law (hudud)” 
(Hasyim, 2006:143). Ibn Jarir “allowed women absolute rights to be leaders,” while Ibn 
Hazm argued that women could have every position but not a head of the state (Hasyim, 
2006:143,139). Other scholars pointed out the historical context of Abu Bakra’s hadith as 
a response to particular developments in Persia at the time and argue that the hadith 
cannot be read and applied literally to the contemporary issues in Muslim communities 
(Izzat, 1997). Shaykh al-Qaradawi, a current religious leader with a strong physical and 
virtual presence in various Muslim communities, granted Muslim women the right to 
hold political office, as a way of furthering the cause of Islam (Stowasser, 2001:110-114). 
 
Whose leadership is it anyway? 
The most obvious contribution of my research to this debate about Muslim 
women leaders is that it continues to problematize conservative views of women’s 
leadership by providing numerous examples of it. This research also continues to 
challenge the assumption that political leadership is limited to formal, public arena such 
as the mosque (a male space), and/or to one’s engagement with the state. Operating under 
this assumption makes it easy to overlook women’s religious and political leadership 
taking place in unusual places, including public places created in the private domains of 
individual Muslims’ homes and at sacred sites. By abandoning this assumption we can 
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clearly see the existence of other leadership models operating in and engendered by the 
particular socio-historical contexts of their respective societies. Otinchalar in the Valley 
claim not to engage with the state; rather they retreat from the state into a public domain 
of private space. 
Further, by focusing on politics in unusual places, it becomes difficult to establish 
and sustain a critical distinction between religious (spiritual) and political leadership. In 
the case of otinchalar, their religious (spiritual) leadership is at the same time political 
leadership that emerges from a systematic attempt to remake themselves and their 
communities through religious education, observance, and advice based on the ethical 
message of Islam as understood by these women. Otinchalar’s politics are not  centered 
on political engagement with the state, but on one’s moral being by teaching others how 
to “not do and do not allow others to do gnoh [bad deeds],” by telling “people about 
Islam,” by sharing knowledge, and educating “each other and ovam hulq [uneducated 
people] slowly” (interview, Feruza-opa, 2002). 
My research also demonstrates that formal and informal distinctions regarding 
religious leadership reflect historically contentious relationships between the state and 
Islam and are based in contextually particular constructions of gender. These distinctions 
between formal and informal do not reflect a natural condition of men to be leaders in the 
public arena and women to be their followers or lead in the private one. In a sense 
otinchalar are formal leaders as well, as some local women in the Valley perceive their 
meetings at homes to be as formal as those at mosques. 
Further, I have exemplified how the current demarcation between formal and 
informal in regard to leadership is porous. A merge of these domains takes place (1) 
within family circles where husbands share information with their wives about the 
meetings at the mosques and wives share with their husbands their Islamic knowledge, 
and (2) among some formal and informal religious leaders, where male leaders consult 
with female leaders on religious and social matters. Otinchalar’s leadership does extend 
to local men through their advice on socio-religious matters and through intra-family 
communications. Hence, in order to fully comprehend the importance of Muslim 
women’s leadership in its different forms, we must critically interrogate the very 
definition of leadership: does to lead others necessarily mean to physically preside over 
them? In the case of otinchalar, their leadership is not over local women and men (nor do 
they aspire to have such leadership positions). Rather it is a leadership by sharing 
knowledge in particular ways engendered by their socio-historical context. 
My research also questions the assumption common to the debate about women’s 
leadership that women desire exactly the same leadership positions possessed by men. 
One’s desire for particular forms of leadership is formed through a human interaction 
with social and physical environments and is historically situated. Some North American 
Muslim women leaders like Amina Wadud have served as leaders in mixed-gender 
communal prayers and were both praised and condemned by Muslims and non-Muslims. 
In a North American context, the history of women’s suffrage and the civil rights 
movement has engendered such desires; many American women fought for a long time to 
be able to occupy male-dominated positions of leadership and authority. Yet, why should 
we assume exactly the same desires on the part of women worldwide, or even on the part 
of all women in North America?
22
 While some desired and fought for their right to work, 
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 For a discussion of other forms of leadership see Mattson (2005).  
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others, particularly poor underprivileged women, like some Muslim women in southern 
California, desired a right to not work, not to be like men (see Rouse, 2004). 
Leading men in congregational prayer at the mosque is only one definition of 
leadership. There are other forms of leadership, such as otinchalar’s, that do not seek 
formal political authority and leadership and do not pursue or advocate radical social 
restructuring. Rather they produce socio-political criticism and leadership in a self-
reflexive manner at a local level, where one has to change oneself and then a collectivity 
of these morally transformed individuals will eventually constitute a morally sound 
Islamic community and perhaps even a polity. 
Finally, I argue that Muslim women’s leadership has to be considered in light of 
the contested models of gender differences within their local communities. These 
differences are not intrinsic, but are socially produced, historically engendered, dynamic, 
and inform not only the division of labor in a society, but also result in often contrasting 
possibilities of expression for men and women. Thus, leadership is enacted and 
experienced differently by and among men and women. In the Valley desire for the 
positions of authority and leadership in the formal public domain are often perceived as 
men’s desires. Local women often desire different forms of socio-religious 
accomplishments through an ongoing cultivation of individual and social moral renewal 
in other spaces and places. They, too, lead. Their leadership, however, takes on different 
forms, equally important, but not exactly the same as those of imams and mullahs at local 
mosques and within local communities. We may read these forms of leadership as what I. 
M. Lewis (1986) called the “dual spiritual economy” in Islam with the two branches, 
male and female, being “interdependent and complementary” (1986:106). Yet, this dual 
spiritual economy, as I have demonstrated, is historically constituted and is not absolute. 
A careful contextual and historical consideration of gender dynamics in a community in 
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